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ABSTRACT 
The distribution of cabinet posts in multiparty coalition 
governments in twelve European countries in the period 1945-1983 is 
considered. The efficacy of three payoff theories, namely Gamson's 
proportional payoff, the kernel and the bargaining set, as predictors 
of portfolio distribution, are compared. It is found that the Gamson 
predictor is superior in five countries which tend to be characterized 
by a relatively unfragmented political system, while the bargaining 
set is more appropriate in the highly fragmented political systems. 
The kernel can be disregarded as a payoff predictor. The results 
provide some empirical justification for the restricted (B2) 
bargaining set as a payoff predictor in simple voting games with 
transferable value. 
INTRODUCTION 
BARGAINING THEORY AND PORTFOLIO PAYOFFS IN 
EUROPEAN COALITION GOVERNMENTS, 1945-1983• 
Norman Schofield and Michael Laver 
Coalition formation has been the subject of much theoretical 
and empirical work in the past decade or so. The theories that have 
been tested all rest, one way or another, upon assumptions about the 
ways in which the �!.ioff accruing to a particular coalition is 
distributed among its members. Yet much less empirical work has been 
done on the process of :e!.i.!!if distribution. Thus some of the 
fundamental assumptions of coalition theories, at least in terms of 
their practical application to coalition g_overnments, have been more 
scantily tested. A number of theories of payoff distribution have 
been recently developed, however. It is the pnrpose of this paper to 
test the application of these theories to the practice of coalition 
government in Europe. 
We begin by looking in more detail at the role of payoff 
theories in coalition formation. We then review both the theoretical 
and empirical work on coalition payoffs, especially those payoffs 
• This material is based upon work supported by a Nuffield Foundation 
Grant on Political Stability. An earlier version was presented at the 
European Public Choice Meeting, Hanstholm, Denmark, April 1983. 
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denominated in terms of cabinet posts. This sets the scene for a 
comparative testing of three theories, namely proportional payoffs, 
the bargaining set and the kernel, in terms of the ability of each 
theory to predict portfolio payoffs in twelve post-war Enropean 
systems. This study is conducted both on a general and a country-by-
country basis, since past analyses have demonstrated that differences 
between countries are at least as significant as those between 
theories. 
THEORIES OF COALITION FORMATION 
Two rather different kinds of theory have been used to explain 
the formation of coalition governments in Enrope. One theory assumes 
that the political game is essentially one of �olicy formation. Thus, 
suppose that a particular set of parties each has a preferred policy 
position on a single dimension of policy. Such theories would imply 
that !av successful coalition � contain the party with the median 
member on that dimension. It is also possible to argue that, as the 
ideological diversity of a potential coalition increases, then the 
parties concerned will find it increasingly difficult to find a common 
policy. On this basis a number of authors have predicted the 
formation of those coalitions that have the least ideological 
diversity (see for example Leiserson, 196 6 ,  1968 and Dodd, 1974, 
1976). In a similar fashion, de Swaan (197 0, 1973) proposed a "policy 
distance" theory, while Axelrod (197 0) suggested that minimal 
connected winning (MCW) coalitions should form.1 
From the point of view of such "policy theories, " the 
distribution of cabinet posts within the coalition is not of great 
importance. In some cases, however, it is perfectly reasonable to 
suppose that the relevant policy space is multidimensional. When 
different parties have different policy emphases on such dimensions, 
the nature of the distribution of portfolios can be highly salient 
(Browne and Feste, 197 5). 
In addition, there have also been a number of analyses of 
coalition formation in a two dimensional policy space that emphasize 
either the idea of connectedness (Grofman, 1981, 1982) or of policy 
bargaining (Winer, 1979 and Ordeshook and Winer, 1980). However, if 
the policy space has !!!Q!£ than two dimensions, then every coalition 
becomes unstable (Schofield, 1978, 1980). This phenomenon is most 
obvious in a voting game with transferable value. 
Suppose, for example, that the only concern of each party is 
to enter government and maximize the number of cabinet posts that it 
controls. In this case !!l: distribution of cabinet posts to the 
3 
members of a coalition is unstable. A new coalition may always emerge 
such that some members of the old coalition can be seduced away with 
higher potential payoffs. In a transferable value game, any 
prediction that a particular coalition is most likely must always be 
extremely tenuous and based on rather indirect reasoning. Using game 
theoretic arguments Riker (1962) proposed that, in a transferable 
value game, "minimal winning" (MW) coalitions might be expected. (A 
minimal winning coalition is one which is winning, but may lose no 
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member and remain winning.) 
There have been several empirical attempts to evaluate Riker's 
minimal winning hypothesis (see, for example, Browne, 1971, and Taylor 
and Laver, 1973). Taylor and Laver found that the MCW hypothesis of 
Axelrod was superior to the MW hypothesis of Riker in the 1945-197 1 
universe of European coalition governments. However, this result was 
dominated by the success of the MCW hypothesis in a few countries, 
particularly Italy. Taylor and Laver also evaluated a number of other 
hypotheses. These include hypotheses that coalitions should be 
winning but minimize diversity and that they should be winning but 
minimize the number of party members. 
The final hypothesis considered by Taylor and Laver is due to 
Gamson (1961). Suppose that there are n parties labeled {1, ••• , n} 
with a distribution [w(l), • • •  , w(n)] of seats. Suppose further that 
there is a fixed number p(N) of cabinet posts. If a coalition M in N 
forms, suppose that the relative reward of party i in M is 
p( i) tlil. • p(N). w(M) 
N 
Here w(M) is the number of seats controlled by coalition M. If j does 
not belong to M we assume p(j) = O. In other words the number of 
portfolios or cabinet posts obtained by a coalition member is directly 
proportional to its contribution to the total weight of the coalition. 
Consider now two different coalitions M and M' with w(M) > w(M'). For 
any player i belonging to both M and M' we find 
'(") - .J!..<..il... (N) > tlil. (N) P 1 w(M') P w(M) P p( i). 
Thus player i prefers coalition M' to M. On the other hand if j 
belongs to M' but not M then p'(j) > p(j). Consequently every member 
of M' prefers M' to M. In this manner the coalition(s) with the 
smallest size (measured in seats) can be expected. Taylor and Laver 
called this hypothesis SW. 
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Table 1 reports the estimate by Taylor and Laver of success 
these five hypotheses: MW, SW, number of parties, diversity, and MCW. 
In five of the twelve countries considered the minimal winning (MW) or 
size theory (SW) works quite successfully. 
[Table 1 here] 
As far as coalition formation is concerned, therefore, all of 
these theories have been comparatively tested. All, as we have seen, 
rest upon explicit or implicit assumptions about the relative 
importance of portfolio payoffs and policy bargaining in coalition 
negotiations. Two features stand out from these results. In the 
first place, the validity of the initial assumptions can be evaluated 
only indirectly by looking at empirical coalition formation. In the 
second place, the specific results vary quite dramatically from 
country to country. This suggests that different assumptions may well 
be appropriate in different countries. Thus policy bargaining may 
well be more important in one system, and portfolio distribution in 
another, a possibility that certainly seems intuitively quite 
plausible. The rest of this paper, therefore, concentrates directly 
on the distribution of portfolios in coalition cabinets. This enables 
at least one type of coalition theoretical assumption to be put to a 
direct empirical test. 
PORTFOLIO DISTRIBUTION: DATA AND THEORY 
6 
Browne and Franklin (1973) have directly examined Gamson's 
hypothesis that the PORTFOLIO payoff to a member of a coalition should 
be directly proportional to its seats. They regressed the actual 
share of portfolios going to each coalition member (y) with the share 
predicted by Gamson (g). The data base was 324 individual parties in 
114 coalitions in thirteen multiparty democracies for the period 1945 
to 1969. The equation that they obtained was: 
g = -0 .01 + 1. 0 7 y  (r2 .85 5) • 
(The model predicted by Gamson is g 
= 
A+ By where A= 0 and B = 1.) 
This is a quite spectacular result, although Browne and Franklin found 
that there was a tendency for the coefficients A and B to depend on 
the number of parties in the coalition. For example, in two party 
coalitions, the regression equation becomes g = -0. 0 5  + 1. 12y, 
implying that any party with less than 40 percent of the seats in a 
two party coalition tends to have a payoff greater than that predicted 
by Gamson. 
Browne and Franklin called this the relative weakness effect: 
a small coalition partner in a coalition with few members would tend 
to receive � portfolios than would be expected from the Gamson 
hypothesis. In large coalitions with many members, however, a small 
party will tend to receive fewer portfolios than predicted by Gamson2 
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(see Table 2). 
[Table 2 here] 
The empirical result that payoffs tend to be directly 
proportional to party weights, but that small parties tend to do 
better than expected in certain situations is extremely provocative. 
The relative weakness effect suggests strongly that small parties 
might have greater bargaining power than indicated purely by their 
size. This suggests the application of more formal bargaining 
theories. 
THE KERNEL AND THE BARGAINING SET 
The bargaining theories that we examine in this paper are the 
kernel and bargaining ,!.!!. Consider a winning coalition that divides 
a fixed prize among its members. For the moment, assume that the 
prize, y(M) has value 1, and consider any distribution [y(i) : i s Ml 
summing to 1. The bargaining set and the kernel concentrate on 
bargaining between pairs of parties, or groups of parties, in the 
coalition over the allocation of this prize. 
Suppose, for example, that party i pivots in the sense of 
being able to form a winning coalition with the set of parties N-M 
outside M. Then if i originally received y(i), the "reward" or 
"surplus" for i's defection is 1 - y(i). It may be the case, however, 
that i cannot pivot, in which case perhaps two parties i and j in M 
pivot if they act together. In this case their surplus is 
1 - y(i) - y(j). Now take a third party r, say, in M, and suppose r's 
surplus is 1 - y(r). The kernel is that distribution of payoffs 
[y(i) : i s Ml such that each party's surplus is identical to that of 
each other party. In this case if party i, for example, attempts to 
form a new coalition excluding party r then r may use his surplus to 
counter bribe i's new partners and form a new winning coalition 
himself. This process is best explained by taking a set of concrete 
examples. 
Example 1. Finland, 1970 
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A four party coalition formed in July 1970 in Finland, based 
upon a seat distribution described in Table 3. The coalition 
controlled 144 seats, leaving fifty-five outside. Since 100 seats are 
required to form a majority, any party with forty-five seats pivots. 
Clearly only the Social Democratic Party (B) pivots. Pivotal groups, 
however, are DA� DF, AF, and DE.
[Table 3 here] 
Table 3 also gives the values of the kernel payoffs, k(i). To 
see how these are computed, suppose the Social Democrats (B) decide to 
form a new coalition with the Farmers Party and Conservatives. Its 
surplus is 1 - k(B) = 1 - 0 .33 = .67 .  On the other hand if the Center 
Party (D) attempts to counter this objection, it needs the Liberal 
Party (E), say, and so its surplus is 
1 - k(D) - k(E) 1 - 0 .25 - o.os .67.
Thus the Center Party and Liberals may together counter-bribe the 
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Farmers Party and Conservatives. The actual proportional reward 
[y(i) : i B M] is also given in Table 3, together with the Gamson 
prediction [g(i) : i B M]. Notice that the relative weakness effect 
is visible in this case; that is to say the two smallest parties 
(Liberals and Swedish Peoples Party) receive higher payoffs than would 
be expected from the Gamson prediction. Moreover, this phenomenon is 
not accounted for by the "lumpiness" of the payoff. Eighteen 
portfolios were actually distributed; the Liberal Party should have 
received one cabinet post according to Gamson, but actually obtained 
two. The kernel does assign higher payoffs to these small parties 
than Gamson, and implicitly therefore declares these parties to have 
greater bargaining power than their weights alone indicate. 
In a previous analysis of coalition portfolio distribution in 
twelve European countries from 1945-197 0, the kernel and Gamson 
predictions were compared (Schofield, 197 6). It was found that the 
Gamson prediction was superior. However, the kernel did catch the 
direction of most mispredictios made by Gamson, suggesting that the 
kernel was able to capture aspect! bargaining power in coalition 
situations, but that it tended to exaggerate these effects. For this 
reason we consider an alternative bargaining notion called the 
bargaining set which is related to, but more refined than, the 
kernel.3 Once more, the easiest method to elaborate this theoretical 
concept is by using a concrete example, although a formal definition 
is provided in the Appendix. 
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Example 2: Belgium, 1958 
Table 4 presents the distribution of seats among the parties 
in Belgium after the election of June 1958. In November 1958 a two 
party coalition of the Christian Social Party (PSC) and Liberals (PLP) 
formally came into existence. Although the PSC had 83 percent of the 
seats within the coalition, they only received thirteen of the 
nineteen cabinet posts (i.e., 68 percent). The Gamson hypothesis 
predicts that the PSC would receive sixteen cabinet posts, so that we 
have another example of the relative weakness effect. 
[Table 4 here] 
There are eighty-seven seats outside the coalition, and 107 
are needed to form a winning coalition. Consequently both the PSC and 
PLP are pivotal. If the PSC received more portfolios than the PLP, 
then its surplus would be less. According to the logic of the kernel, 
the PLP, with a higher surplus, could then force the PSC out of the 
coalition. However, the kernel prediction of 9.5 cabinet posts for the 
PLP is clearly counter-intuitive. Indeed, it would appear reasonable 
that the PSC did in fact have greater bargaining power than the PLP. 
Using the notion of the bargaining set, however, we can predict that 
the PLP has sufficient bargaining power to guarantee six posts for 
itself, but no more. 
Suppose the PLP attempts to form a winning coalition, by 
excluding the PSC. Since there are 212 seats altogether, and the PLP 
already has twenty-one, it needs a further eighty-six. On the other 
hand the PSC has 104 and so needs only three seats. If the PLP 
"objects" to the PSC then the PSC may "retaliate" by forming a 
coalition either with the Belgian Social Party (BSP) or, at least 
formally, with the combination of Communists and Flemish Peoples 
Party. 
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Imagine that the PLP has five posts in the original coalition 
with the PSC. We suppose that when the PLP objects, it takes one 
further post for itself, leaving thirteen posts of the fourteen 
originally controlled by the PSC. The PLP now forms a coalition with 
the Belgian Social Party (BSP) and the Communists (PCB), giving the 
BSP seven posts say and the PCB six. 
In the original coalition the PSC had fourteen posts. If it 
is to form a new winning counter coalition, and to be in an equally 
attractive situation, it only has five posts with which it can 
counter-bribe either the BSP and PCB. To attract the BSP away from 
the coalition with the Liberals it must offer it at least seven posts, 
leaving only � (rather than fourteen) for itself. Consequently 
the PLP can effectively blackmail the PSC to increase the number of 
cabinet posts which it controls. On the other hand suppose that the 
PLP originally has six posts. In the objection the PLP may give six 
each to the BSP and PCB. But then the PSC can retaliate by forming a 
coalition with the BSP, giving them six posts as well, thus retaining 
control of thirteen posts. 
With thirteen posts the PSC has no objection to the PLP. Even 
if the PSC does form a coalition with, say, the BSP, giving the latter 
five posts, the Liberals may counter this objection by offering the 
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BSP six posts, the Communists one post, and gaining six posts for 
itself. Thus, in the bargaining game between the Christian Social 
Party and Liberals, the bargaining set asserts that the Liberals have 
greater bargaining power than their relative size alone would 
indicate, and are justified in claiming six cabinet posts. 
Example 3: Finland, 1954 
In the previous example the bargaining set provided a 
theoretical interpretation of the relative weakness effect. In that 
example a small party in a coalition with only two members received a 
greater number of portfolios than that predicted by Gamson. We now, 
however, provide an illustration of why the relative weakness effect 
need not occur in coalitions with many members. 
In Finland a four party coalition (of Social Democrat Party 
(B), Center Party (D), Swedish Peoples Party (F) and Conservatives 
(G)) was formed in May 1954. Since there were 200 parliamentary seats 
altogether, the first two parties with 107 seats between them, could 
have formed a winning coalition (see Table 5). 
[Table 5 here] 
The distribution of portfolios that occurred was (6: 6: 1: 1) 
while the Gamson prediction was (5.25 : 5. 15 : 1.26: 2.34). Suppose that 
the Social Democrats only have four cabinet posts. Following the 
logic of the bargaining set, consider an objection by this party to 
the other three parties. These three control ninety seats and 
therefore can form a counter coalition with either the Popular 
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Democrats or Liberals. Consequently the Social Democrats, in forming 
an objection, take five posts, and distribute four to the Popular 
Democrats and five to the Liberals. The three previous coalition 
partners need ten posts but only have four to give to the Liberals. 
Thus the bargaining power of the Social Democrats require that they 
have at least five posts. The same calculations show that the Center 
Party requires five posts for stability. Consider now the small 
Conservative Party with twenty-four seats. Since there are fifty-six 
seats outside the coalition, a party needs forty-five seats to be able 
to bring an objection to bear. Even allied with the Swedish Peoples 
Party { with thirteen seats) the Conservatives are unable to form an 
objection against either of the two large parties. Consequently the 
bargaining power that these two small parties have entitles them to no 
cabinet posts. The kernel distribution is obviously (7 : 7: 0: 0). 
However, the bargaining set only guarantees five posts for the two 
larger parties. As a result the actual distribution (6: 6: 1: 1) is 
stable, according to the logic of the bargaining set. 
An important distinction is apparent between the cases 
discussed in Examples 1 and 3. In the first example, the large size 
of the coalition {approximately 75 percent of all seats) means that a 
party needs 25 percent of all seats to pivot. The bargaining game 
inside the coalition is one of pivotal subgroup against pivotal 
subgroup. In this case the kernel performs not at all badly. 
However, in the third example only the two larger parties pivot, and 
the kernel "over estimates" their bargaining power. Since the 
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coalition is large {again with 75 percent of the seats) the bargaining 
power of all members of the coalition is reduced, according to the 
bargaining set. As a consequence the two larger parties can only 
guarantee themselves five posts. In this sense, stability is "easier" 
in large coalitions. 
These three examples together illustrate that, while it is 
possible to find theoretical reasons for the relative weakness effect, 
the reasons themselves are conditional, not so much on gross 
quantitative features such as the number of parties in the coalition, 
but rather on quite precise aspects of the distribution of resources. 
A second point is that the bargaining set uses as part of its calculus 
the ability of coalition members to construct new coalitions to be 
used as bargaining ploys. In computing the payoffs which are stable 
according to the bargaining set, we have assumed no restrictions on 
possible coalitions. {This is plausible in the case of Finland, since 
just about every possible coalition that can form, has formed. ) In 
particular, wide ideological differences between two parties may make 
them incompatible as coalition parties. This would render potential 
coalitions containing both parties as effectively impossible. In 
general, the ideological importance of policy bargaining in some 
systems may impose quite severe constraints upon the universe of 
possible coalitions. 
Consequently, we might expect the bargaining set to be an 
accurate predictor in some countries, but not in others. Thus in the 
next part of the paper we turn to a comparison, across twelve European 
countries, of the kernel, bargaining set and Gamson predictors of 
portfolio distribution. 
COMPARISON OF THE PAYOFF PREDICTORS OVER ALL CASES 
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Data was collected on the distribution of cabinet posts in 134 
coalition governments (involving 406 individual cases) in twelve 
European countries for the post-war period (see Table 6). 
[Table 6 here] 
In a number of these countries (particularly Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway, and Sweden) a large number of the governments that 
formed were single party majority or minority cases. As Table 6 
indicates, there were only a small number of multiparty majority 
governments in these countries. Since all cabinet posts in a single 
party government go to that party, such cases are not relevant to the 
analysis here. However, there were six further cases of multiparty 
but minority governments (see Table 6). In these cases it is possible 
to calculate the Gamson prediction of the parties in the minority 
coalition. However, a presumption underlying the bargaining set is 
that the coalition in question is winning. For this reason, these six 
cases were not included in the analysis. 
The distribution of portfolios predicted by each of the three 
theories under consideration was calculated along the lines described 
in the previous section. The actual number (rather than the 
proportion) of portfolios was used to enable us to investigate the 
possible impact of the inevitable "lumpiness" of the payoffs involved. 
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(In the real world, of course, it is just riot possible for a party to 
receive, say, 1.87 cabinet seats, whatever a theory might predict). 
The Gamson, Bargaining set, and kernel predictions for case i are 
referred to as G(i), B(i) and K(i) respectively. 
In a particular parliamentary situation, the actual 
distribution of weights and the knowledge of which coalition has 
formed uniquely determines both the Gamson and the kernel predictions. 
On the other hand the bargaining set specifies a minimum allocation of 
posts to the various coalition members. Generally this results in a 
unique allocation; when a set of allocations is predicted in a 
particular situation, we used a centrally located prediction.4 
Consequently, as Figure 1 illustrates, the distribution of 
weights can be said to determine the three predictors G, B, K. 
[Figure 1 here] 
In analyzing the relationship Y = px, where I is one of our 
three predictors and Y the actual portfolio payoff, we must thus be 
aware that the three predictors are themselves dependent on each 
other, because of the manner of their definition. Figure 2 
illustrates the empirical relationship between the Gamson and 
Bargaining set predictors for the particular set of coalitions that we 
studied. Table 7 gives r2 (explained variance) in the dependent 
variable (actual cabinet posts allocated to each coalition member in 
our universe) given by our three predictors, together with the beta 
weights in the multiple regression 
Y = P6G + p8B + P�· 
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[Figure 2 and Table 7 here] 
Figures 3, 4, S illustrate in scattergram form the simple 
relationships between the dependent variable and the three predictors. 
These results are obtained using all 406 cases in the analysis, and 
contain a number of striking features. While each of the theoretical 
predictors bears a quite definite relationship with the actual 
payoffs, Gamson is obviously the most effective and the kernel the 
least. The relative efficacy of each predictor is quite clearly 
illustrated by the beta weights, with Gamson by far the most 
successful. All of the raw predictive power of the kernel, and most 
of that of the bargaining set appears to be a product of their inter­
relationship with the Gamson predictors, at least when all cases are 
taken together. 
[Figures 3, 4, and S here] 
We are not, of course, simply testing the proposition that 
there is .!.Q!!!! linear relationship between predictors. We are testing 
the much more precise proposition that payoffs and predictors are 
identical. The model is not just that: 
Y = a + bl 
(where Y is the observed payoff and I the predicted payoff) but also 
that a =  0 and b = 1. The coefficients a, b produced by the simple 
regressions for the three predictors are presented in Table 8. The 
t-test shows that each constant differs from zero and each slope 
differs from one at a significance level of 0. 001. 
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[Table 8 here] 
The values of these coefficients thus show that each theory 
systematically mispredicts payoffs, though this effect is greatest for 
the kernel and least for the bargaining set. Furthermore, this 
systematic misprediction takes the same form for each theory. Each 
regression has a positive constant and a slope of less than unity. 
Consider the regression equation Y = (1.18) + (0. 7 9)6 for the 
Gamson predictor. The mean number of portfolios distributed to each 
party in this universe is S .63 (see Table 9). Consequently any player 
receiving less than approximately the mean number of portfolios will 
tend to actually receive more portfolios than predicted by Gamson. 
This relative weakness effect noted by Browne and Franklin with 
respect to the Gamson predictor, in fact, is valid both for the kernel 
and bargaining set predictors as well.5 However, Table 8 provides 
some indication that the distortion of the bargaining set is somewhat 
less than the Gamson predictor. 
To summarize the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
analysis of all cases up to this point, the kernel is clearly inferior 
to the other two theories in all respects. Choosing between Gamson 
and the bargaining set depends upon whether we are more concerned with 
the strength or the nature of the relationship between predicted and 
observed payoffs. Gamson is a rather better simple predictor, though 
its predictions have more systematic distortion on the basis of these 
results. A relative evaluation of these deductive theories, 
therefore, is ambiguous on the basis of these results. Further light 
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can be thrown on this matter, however, by an analysis of 
mispredictions. 
[Table 9 here] 
In order to do this, the "notional" residuals were calculated 
reflecting discrepancies, not between observations and the regression 
lines, but between observations and the Y = X line, for the three 
predictors G, B and K. That is to say for each theory, X, and 
observation we compute the error � 
= 
y - x. 
A notional "variance explained" for theory X is then given by 
r2 1 
variance(E1) 
variance (Y) • 
The results are reported in Table 9. As we should expect, the mean 
level of misprediction for all theories is effectively zero, since 
overprediction within a coalition is matched by corresponding 
underpredictions. The variances of the theoretical mispredictions, 
however, are instructive. These values combine in a single figure the 
consequences of the scatter of observed payoffs around the line of 
best fit and of the systematic distortion in the payoff predictions. 
From these it can be immediately seen that, overall, the kernel is the 
least effective theory and Gamson the most. 
The "notional r2" summarizes the proportion of variance in the 
actual payoffs explained, not by the regression line, but by the 
original theories. Comparing these figures with those in Table 7 ,  we 
get a more realistic evaluation of the performance of the theories. 
We see that the gap between Gamson and the Bargaining set has narrowed 
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a little, by virtue of the latter's slightly lesser distortion, and 
the the kernel looks even worse than it did at first sight, since it 
is both a poor, and a distorted, predictor. 
There can be little doubt that the Gamson theory is the best 
of the three theories as an inductive predictor of coalition portfolio 
payoffs over all cases. Not only does the kernel perform relatively 
poorly, but such success as it does have depends almost entirely on 
the interrelationship of its predictions with those of the more 
successful theories. It is also clear that all theories make 
systematic mispredictions, overestimating big payoffs and 
underestimating small ones. 6 
Table 10 presents information on the regression equations of Y 
on the three predictors taken singly and together, but this time on 
data sets associated with parties of varying rank. With the largest 
parties (rank 1) in each coalition, the Gamson prediction is clearly 
the best whereas the Bargaining set tends to underpredict (a = 2.56 
and b = .74). However, for parties ranking third or below in their 
coalition, Gamson's theory breaks down completely Cr2 = .19), whereas 
the distortion of the bargaining set is much less pronounced. Thus 
while the bargaining set predictions are slightly less distorted than 
those of Gamson, they are noticeably more erratic. This reflects the 
fact that, when the bargaining set does badly, it does very badly, 
while Gamson is better in general, a factor that will become much 
clearer in our discussion, below, of the country-by-country analysis. 
[Table 10 here] 
21 
COMPARISON OF THE PREDICTORS ACROSS COUNIRIES 
As we mentioned in the first part of this paper, empirical 
analyses of coalition formation have shown that different theories 
perform quite differently in different countries. Since the basis for 
coalition bargaining appears to vary across countries, there are good 
reasons to suppose that theories that predict coalition �ayoffs will 
also have different applications in different systems. For example, 
it might well be the case that ideology is not a particularly 
significant determinant of coalition formation in some countries. In 
this case the emphasis could well be on party control of cabinet 
positions. Such a situation more closely resembles the bargaining 
game over a fixed resource that is modeled by the theory of games with 
transferable value. Coalitions that occur in such situations might 
then tend to be minimal winning. 
On the other hand if ideology is paramount, then one would 
expect to see coalitions that satisfied one of the ideological 
criteria, such as diversity or the MCW property. A looser indication 
would be whether or not the party with the median seat tended to 
belong to government coalitions. In these cases, cabinet posts might 
very well be distributed according to a normative criterion, which is 
essentially what the Gamson hypothesis stipulates. 
Country-by-country variations in the predictive success of the 
various theories are reported in Table 11. For each of the twelve 
countries studied, this table shows the simple regression of the 
observed payoff on the theoretical prediction, as well as the multiple 
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regression including all predictors. This table also indicates those 
cases in which the coefficient b is not significantly different from 1 
and those in which the coefficient a is !!2! significantly different 
from O. Table 11 clearly shows considerble country-by-country 
variation. Bearing in mind that we are looking both for high 
correlations and appropriate coefficients, we can immediately see that 
the kernel meets with little success throughout. Comparing Gamson 
with the bargaining set, it is clear that one model or the other fits 
very well for most countries. Table 12 summarizes these findings, 
which are also reflected in the relative sizes of the beta weights in 
the appropriate multiple regressions. They are, for the most part, 
quite unambiguous, with Gamson performing clearly better in Austria, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg and Norway, while the bargaining set is 
superior for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden. The only 
ambiguity can be found in Italy, where both theories do equally well 
on all counts, and the Netherlands where Gamson is slightly better 
(with a higher P coefficient in the multiple regression) but has more 
distortion (the simple regression coefficients differ more from 
predicted values). 
[Tables 11 and 12 here] 
The task that remains, of course, is to provide some 
explanation of the country-by-country variations in the apparent 
nature of coalition bargaining. We have already indicated the 
possibility that this is dependent on the balance between the 
ideological and distributional features of the parliamentary game for 
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these countries. A full investigation of such matters is properly the 
subject 01 another paper, although Table 13 does summarize what seem 
to us to be some salient differences between systems. 
[Table 13 here] 
In this table we present data on the durability and type of 
coalitions that form, together with the size of the party system 
(defined as the "effective number" of parties or the reciprocal of the 
Herfindahl fragmentation measure; see Schofield, 1981). We notice 
straight away that the Gamson predictor tends to work better in 
countries (such as Austria, Germany and Ireland) with small party 
systems and stable governments. Conversely the Bargaining Set tends 
to be associated with countries, such as Belgium, Denmark and Finland, 
with larger party systems and less durable coalitions. 
The difference in the sizes of the party systems associated 
with the two theories is particularly striking. Where Gamson works 
best, we are effectively dealing with two/three party systems. In 
such simple bargaining systems, the fact that any two parties can form 
a majority is patently obvious. The notorious instability of three 
actor zero-sum bargaining games will be intuitively appreciated, and 
the temptation to resort to some normative criterion, such as direct 
proportionality, might seem overwhelming. That way at least � 
stability is introduced. A norm may even emerge that this is how 
things "should" be done in the knowledge that, if they are not done 
this way, instability will reign. Conversely, as we showed in our 
discussion of Example 3, bargaining stability can be "easier" in large 
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coalitions. Bargaining will inevitably be more complex, of course, 
but out of this complex process a clearer indication of differences in 
the effective bargaining weight of various parties may emerge, and be 
reflected in payoffs. Thus the qualitative nature of the 
distributional game may well vary with the complexity of the 
bargaining system. 
The role of ideology in the system can be indicated, as we 
have suggested, by the frequency of ideologically compact or connected 
coalitions, and this information can also be found in Table 13. The 
evidence here is also quite strong, with a much clearer tendency for 
the countries predicted best by Gamson to show more signs of 
ideological bargaining. There is a noticeably higher proportion of 
connected coalitions in this group, reflecting the possibility that 
more of the bargaining action concerns coalition policy, with parties 
resorting to some form of normative criterion such as Gamson to settle 
the distribution of portfolios. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be unwise to set too much store by these 
speculations, which clearly merit further investigation. In future 
papers, we will be reporting on direct tests of the role of policy 
payoffs in the same systems, but meanwhile we can draw some tentative 
conclusions about the relative impact of portfolios and ideology. It 
seems to be the case that Gamson works best in a set of systems 
characterized both by small party systems and connected coalitions. 
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Small party systems may produce more unstable zero-sum bargaining 
games (and hence a need for some distributional norm) but they also, 
of course, are more likely to produce connected coalitions (the scope 
for unconnected coalitions is much less). We must thus offer two 
alternative interpretations of the relative success of Gamson and the 
bargaining set. The success of Gamson may reflect a desire for 
stability in unstable situations, while that of the bargaining set 
reflects a recognition of the complexities of bargaining power in more 
complicated situations. Alternatively, it may be that in some 
countries it is the ideological nature of the game that is more 
important, and this is reflected in the incidence of connected 
coalitions and the consequently lesser importance of portfolio 
payoffs, whose distribution is determined by Gamson's normative 
proportionality criterion. 
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APPENDIX 
THE BARGAINING SET 
Here we give a brief formal definition of the bargaining set 
and kernel. 
A game with transferable value for a society N = {l, • • •  , n} is 
a function v 2N -7 m where 2N is the power set of N (i.e., the 
class of all subsets, or coalitions, of N). 
The number, v(M), is the value associated with coalition M. 
We assume for any individual i in N that v({i}) l O. 
The game v is simple if and only if there exists a class, V, 
of winning coalitions such that 
v(M) 1 iff M e V 
v(M) 
= 
0 iff M i V. 
The simple game v is proper iff whenever M1, M2 e; V then Hi n M2 is 
nonempty. In other words only one winning coalition may form at any 
one time. For the voting games considered in this paper each party, 
i, in N has weight w(i) and a coalition M is winning iff 
where 
w(M) = f w( i) ) tlfil.,teM 2 
w(N) r w( i) 
• tsN 
Such a weighted voting game is clearly proper. 
For coalition )( &-V let V(M) be the subset of JR n defined as 
follows: 
x & V(M) iff (i) x. = 0 for all j � M. 
J 
(ii) xi 1 0 for all i & M.
(iii) � xi = v(M). 1& 
A :2.!voff configuration (p. c. ) is a pair (x,M) where M & 
x = Cx1, • • •  ,xn) belongs to V(M). 
and 
One payoff configuration (y,C) dominates another (x,M) iff 
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Yi> xi for each i & C. In this case write (y,C)dom(x,M). The� 
is the set of payoff configurations which are undominated. For a 
typical (proper simple) voting game the core will be empty. However, 
the core will be nonempty if there exists a veto player; a veto player 
is a player (or party) that belongs to every winning coalition. In 
the case considered here a veto player, i, is one with half the 
weight, i. e. , w(i) l :Y.,(N). When the core is empty, every payoff 
configuration will be unstable (i. e. ,  dominated by another). We 
therefore look for a solution theory to select those payoff 
configurations that might be "less unstable" in some sense. 
Consider a p. c. , (x,M), dominated by another, (y,C). The 
latter may be considered a "threat" by any player i in C n M to a 
player j in M\C. On the other hand suppose that there exists a p. c. , 
(x,D), dominating (y,C), where j & D, such that z .  l x . •  Then the 
J J 
threat by i to j may be countered by j without loss. 
We make this more formal. 
If L,J are two subsets of N, let TLJ be the family of 
supersets of L which do not intersect J. Thus 
TLJ = {A C N : L c A and J n A = 4>1 
Definition 1 
Let (x,M) be a p. c. and L,J two disjoint subsets of the 
coalition M. 
(a) An objection by L against J with respect to (x,M) is a p.c. , 
(y,C) such that 
(i) C & TLJ
(ii) Yi > xi for all i & L 
(iii) Yi l xi for all i & C. 
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(b) A counter objection by J against L's objection, (y,C), is a p.c., 
(x,D), such that 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
D & TJL 
zj l xj for all j & J 
z. l y. for all j e D. 
J J 
(c) An objection (y,C) by L again J is said to be justified if there 
is no counter objection by J to (y,C). If L has a justified 
objection against J with respect to the p. c. , (x,M), then write 
LP(x)J. 
Definition 2 
(a) A p. c. , (x,M), is called B1-stable if to any objection by an 
individual i against an individual j e M\{i), there is a counter 
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objection by j. Let B1(M) be the set of B1-stable payoff vectors 
for M, and call B1(M) the B1-bargaining set for M. Thus 
B1(M) = {x s V(M) : (x, M) is B1-stable} 
(b) A p.c., (x, M), is called B2-stable if to any objection by an 
individual i against any subgroup Jc M\{i}, there is a counter 
objection by J. Let B2(M) be the set of B2-stable payoff vector 
for M. Thus B2(K) = {x s V(M) : (x, M) is B2-stable}. 
Suppose we write iP2(x)j when individual i has a justified 
objection against a subgroup Jc M\{i} which contains j. Clearly 
iP(x)j implies that iP2(x)j. 
Moreover, 
B1 (M) {x s V(M) iP(x)j for no i, j s M} 
and 
B2(M) = {x s V(M) iP2(x)j for no i, j s M} 
and so B2(M) C B1(M). 
Note that if i objects with (y, C) then this may be regarded as 
an objection against the subgroup M\C. For B1-stability each 
individual j in M\C must be able to counter object by (z(j), D(j)), 
say. For B2-stability the whole group M\C must be able to form a 
counter objection (z, D) such that M\C c D and z. l x. for all j s M\C. J J 
Clearly a B2 counter objection will be more difficult to effect than a 
B1 counter objection. From results by Peleg (1967) and Davis and 
Maschler (1967) it is known for simple voting games that for � 
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winning coalition, M, the B1-bargaining set B1(M) is nonempty. This is 
not the case for B2• On the other hand there will exist!!?!!!£ winning 
coalition, M, such that B2(M) is nonempty. In this paper we computed 
B2(M), when nonempty, for each winning coalition that formed. When 
B2(M) was empty we computed an approximation to B2CM) called B•(M). 
The definition and motivation behind B• can be found in Schofield 
(1979' 1982). 
To define the kernel we proceed as follows. Let (x, M) be a 
p.c. For any other coalition C, define the � of C over x to be 
where 
ex(C) v(C) - x(C) 
x(C) = [ xi. isC 
This excess is the amount the members of C stand to gain if they can 
form this coalition. Suppose now that i, j are two players in the 
coalition M. 
Define the !J!!P!!!.! of i over j to be 
S .. = max {e (C) 1J c x 
C s  T .. }. Thus i's surplus over j is the maximum 1J 
excess of i over x, across all coalitions that include i but exclude 
j. 
Say that i outweighs j (with respect to (x, M)) iff 
( i) xj ) O 
( ii) s ij > s j i, 
and in this case write i Q(x)j. 
Define the Kernel, K(M), of M to be: 
K(M) {x e V(M) i Q(x)j for no i, j e M}. 
It is well known that if (x,M) is a p. c. and i, s M, then 
i P(x)j => i Q(x)j 
(see Schofield, 1979). 
Thus K(M) c B1(M). 
The proof of this remark is obtained by showing that if i 
objects to another player. j, but i's excess over j does not exceed 
j's, then j may counter object. Thus the excess of one player over 
another is in some sense a measure of how much one player is 
underprivileged vis A vis another. 
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Although the kernel gives, in a general. a unique vector in 
V(M), it does not use all information about the bargaining 
possibilities. In particular, as we have seen, if two players both 
pivot then for their excesses to be identical, they must receive 
identical payoffs. This can, on occasion, lead to counter intuitive 
predictions. In general it is not the case that K(M) belongs to 
B2(M). Indeed it is precisely when K(M) appears counter intuitive 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. A minimal connected winning coalition is one that is winning 
(i. e. , has a parliamentary majority) and connected (all parties in 
the coalition have adjacent preferred policy positions) and may 
lose no party yet preserve these properties. 
2. In a later analysis of the data Browne and Frendreis (1980)
verified that this phenomenon was not purely an artifact of the 
lumpiness of the data. 
3. For a fuller discussion of theses bargaining notions, see 
Schofield (1979). 
4. See Schofield (1982) for further details of the methodology 
involved in computing the bargaining set. 
5 .  In comparing our results with those o f  Browne and Franklin, of 
course, account must be taken of the fact that they predict 
proportion, while � predict numbers, of cabinet seats. This 
should not affect the slopes much, but our constant of about one 
portfolio reflects, given a mean cabinet size of about 20 
that it does not belong to B2(M). 
use of B2(M) in the paper. 
It is for this reason that we make portfolios, a proportionate constant of about 0 . 0 5 .  
6 .  W e  also verified that this systematic misprediction was not purely 
a result of the lumpy nature of the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 1 
COALITION FORMATION PREDICTORS 
(Taylor and Laver , 1945-1971) 
Belgium MW 
Luxemburg MW/no. parties 
Ireland MW 
Iceland divers i ty/SW 
Norway SW 
Germany divers ity/Mew 
Aus tria MCW/divers ity 
Sweden MCW/SW 
Netherlands MCW/MW 
Denmark MCW 
Finland MCW/MW 
Italy MCW 
1w '-I 
TABLE 2
Number of 
parties in Number of Number of 2 coalit ion coalitions cases r A B 
2 54 114 .78 -0.05 1.12 
3 24 72 .88 -0.07 1.26 
4 26 104 .81 0.02 0.98 
::: 5 7 34 .97 0. 02 0.92 
Regress ion equat ions g = A+By for coalit ions containing different number 
of part ies. Taken from Browne and Franklin (1973) . 
w 
CX> 
TABLE 3 
(Finland 1970) 
Parties Seats g (i) y (i) 
A: Popular Democrats 36 0.25 0.22 
B: Social Democratic Party 51 0. 35 0.28 
C: Small Farmers Party 18 
D: Center Party 37 0.26 0.28 
E: Liberal Party 8 0. 06 0.11 
F: Swedish Peoples Party 12 0.08 0. 11
G: Cons ervatives 37 
TOTAL 199 1.00 1.00 
--
Comparison of the Gams on (g) and kernel (k) predictors of actual 
portfolio dis tribut ion (y) . 
k (i) 
0.17 
0.33 
0.25 
0.08 
0.17 
1.00 
w 
l.O 
Parties 
A: Communis ts (PCB) 
B: Belgian So cial Party (BSP) 
C: Christian Social Party (PSC) 
D: Liberals (PLP) 
E: Flemish Peoples Party (FFP) 
TOTAL 
S eats 
2 
84 
104 
21 
1 
212 
TABLE 4 
(Belgium 1958) 
% Portfolios 
83 13 
17 6 
% Gamson % B2 
% Kernel 
68 15 .8 83 13 68 9.5 
32 3. 2 17 6 32 9.5 
Comparison of the Bargaining Set , Gamson and Kernel predictions of actual portfolio dis tribution. 
40 
% 
50 
50 
Parties 
A: Popular Democrats 
B: Social Democratic Party 
D: Center Party 
E: Liberal Peoples Party 
F: Swedish Peoples Party 
G: Conservatives 
TOTAL 
Seats 
43 
54 
53 
13 
13 
24 
200 
TABLE 5 
(Finland 1954)
% Portfolios 
38 6 
37 6 
9 1 
16 1 
14 
The number of cabinet pos t s  guaranteed by the bargaining set 
41 
% Gamson % B2 
% Guaranteed 
43 5. 25 38  6 43 5 
43 5.15 37 6 43 5 
7 1.26 9 1 7 0 
7 2.34 16 1 7 0 
TABLE 6 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Country Number Period 
Aus tria 1 Nov. 1945-Nov. 196 2 
Belgium 2 Feb. 1946-Nov. 1981 
Denmark 3 May 1957-Jan. 1968 
Finland 4 April 1945 -May 1979 
Germany 5 Sep t. 1949-0ct. 1982 
Iceland 6 June 1946-Dec. 1979 
Ireland 7 Feb. 1948-Feb. 1973 
Italy 8 July 1946-June 1981 
Luxemburg 9 Nov. 1946-June 1979 
Netherlands 10 July 1946-Sep t. 1981 
Norway 11 Sept. 1961-Sep t. 196 5 
Sweden 12 Sep t. 1952-Sept. 1979 
TOTAL 
Multiparty but minority governments. 
Country Period 
Belgium April-June 1974 
Denmark Sept.-Oct. 1978 
Ireland June 1981-Feb. 1982 
Italy May-Dec. 1947 
Nov. 1975 -July 1976 
Norway Oct. 1972-Sept. 1973 
Number Number 
Coalitions Cases 
8 17 
23 58 
3 8 
21 89 
14 32 
11 27 
3 11 
22 75 
10 22 
12 47 
2 8 
5 12 
134 406 
Duration (months )
2 
1 
8 
7 
8 
11 
� 
N 
Predictor 
Garns on 
TABLE 7 
S IMPLE AND MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS OF OBSERVED 
PAYOFFS ON PAYOFF PREDICTORS (ALL CASES) 
r2 for simp le 
regress ion of 
predictor on 
payoff 
.90* 
Beta weight in 
multiple regression 
+ 0. 73* 
Bargaining s et 
• 77* +0.27* 
Kernel .53* 0.00 
*Significant at .00001 level. Overall r2 for multiple regres sion . 92. 
� 
w 
TABLE 8 
S IMPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE THREE PREDICTORS 
Predictor Slope (b) Cons tant (a) 
Garns on +o. 79 1.18 
Bargaining set +0.82 0.98 
Kernel +o. 67 1.84 
NB b = 1 a = 0 if theory is correct. 
.i::­
.i::-
Errors in 
Theory 
Garns on 
Bargaining set 
Kernel 
Actual (Y) 
TABLE 9 
ANALYSIS OF MISPREDICTIONS (ALL CASES) 
Mispredict ions in Portfolios 
Mean Variance 
-0 . 019 2 . 46 
-0. 012 3.95 
-0 . 022 9.00 
5 . 63 15.00 
Notional 11r211
.84 
.74 
. 40 
.i::-. 
IJl 
TABLE 10 
PREDICTORS BY PARTY RANK 
I Party Rank 
Simple Regres sion I 1 2 2 Garns on r .90 . 6 9 
b 
• 77 . 86 
a 1. 29 1. 21
Bargaining set 2 . 6 7 .57 r 
b .74 . 6 2 
a 2. 56 1. 91
Kernel 2 .41 . 36 r 
b .63 .41 
a 4. 06 2.63 
Multiple Regres s ion 2 .91 . 79 r 
SG .84 .59 
S
B . 14 .40 
SK 
--
--
� 3
.19 
.40 
1.91 
. 58 
.65 
.96 
.14 
.19 
2.35 
.58 
--
. 76 
--
.i::--
0\ 
47 
TABLE 11 
PREDICTORS BY COUNTRY 
Country AUS BEL* DEN* FIN* GER ICE* IRE ITA LUX NET NOR SWE* 
SimEle Regress ion 
Gamson 2 .S5 .7 S .SS .S3 .96 • 71 .9S .93 .SS .93 .56 · ) . 99 r 
b .Slx .74 .56 .92x .SOX .62 .94x . 72 .96x .S5 
• 
72x .74 
a .S7
+ 
2.04 2.63 .30
+ 
L 55
+ 
L 72 .24
+ 
L 7 7  .29
+ 
.66 1 . 13
+ 
L S6 
Bargaining 
2 
.46 .94 .95 .95 .39 .S5 .49 .92 .23 .S3 L O  r --
S et b .25 L 05x L 09x .99x .6 Sx .S5x L l2x .S9 .33 .97x L OX--
a 4.22 0.36
+ 
0.56
+
.05
+ 
2.41
+ 
� 65
+ 
-o ·.46
+
.73 4.S4 .13
+ -- 0.0+ 
Kernel 
2 
.44 .59 .56 .33 .49 .35 .52 .16 .52 r --
b .25 .79x -- .65 .62x .SOx L OX .6 6  . 29 .61 
a 4.24 1.65
+ -- L 23 2.S4+ .S9+ 0.01+ 2.20 5.12 L 6 
MultiEle Regres sion 
2 
.90 .95 .95 .96 .96 .S5 .9S .96 .SS .94 .56 L O  r 
S
G . 77 .lS -- .20 .97 -- .99 .51 .94 .79 .79 
S
B .2S .Sl .9S .S7 -- .92 -- .4S -- .19 -- L O  
S
K 
No. Cas es 1 7  5S s S9 32 27 11 75 22 47 s 12 
* = Bargaining set predictor clearly superior.
x = not s ignificantly different from 1 us ing a two tailed T tes t at the 0.01 level. 
+
= not significantly different from 0 us ing a two tailed T test at the 0.01 level. 
TABLE 12 
RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF GAMSON AND BARGAINING SET , BY COUNTRY 
CRITERION 
Theory wi th Theory with Theory with 
High er Simp le Better Simple Higher beta 
Country r2 . Coe fficients Weight 
Aus tria Gams on Gamson Garns on 
Belgitnn Bargaining Set Bargaining Set Bargaining Set 
Denmark Bargaining Set Bargaining Set Bargaining Set 
Finland Bargaining Set Bargaining Set Bargaining Set 
Germany Gams on Gams on Garns on 
Iceland Bargaining Set Bargaining Set Bargaining Set 
Ireland Gams on Garns on Gamson 
Italy Equal Bargaining Set Equal 
Luxemburg Gams on Gams on Gamson 
Netherlands Gams on Bargaining Set Gams on 
Norway Garns on Gams on Gamson 
Sweden Equal Bargaining Set Bargaining Set 
� 
°' 
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TABLE 13
COALITION CHARACTERISTICS IN THE TWELVE COUNTRIES , 1945-1983
Effective No . Average Duration Proportion (%) of Period of Coalition Type* Does Median 
Parties in of Government Party Belong 
Group Best Predictor Country 1971-1983 1945-1983 MW Conne cted Unconnected Minority Maj ority to Coalit ion 
1 Bargaining Set Belgium 5 . 8 21 80 34 53 2 11 No 
Denmark 5 . 7 26 20 20 80 No 
Finland 5 . 4 14 23 36 41 33 Yes 
Iceland 4 .0 34 83 51 7 No 
Sweden 3 . 4 27 30 -- - 64 Yes 
2 Ambiguous Italy 3 . 4 13 12 47 10 31 -- Yes 
Netherlands 5 . 4 29 36 77 17 1 -- Yes 
3 Gamson Austria 2 . 2 40 45 56 - - 15 29 Yes 
Germany 2 .5 40 74 90 10 - -- Nearly 
always 
Ireland 2 . 5 38 30 -- 30 33 37 Nearly 
always 
Luxemburg 3 . 8 43 99 86 14 - - - - No 
Norway 3 . 3 36 20 20 -- 36 44 Yes . 
until 1981
Data taken from Schofield (1983) .
Minority and Maj ority repres ent single party governments . Note that a minimal winning (MW) coalition may possibly be connected or 
unconnected . 
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FIGURE 4 
THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTUAL PAYOFF AND THE BARGAINING SET PREDICTOR 
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FIGURE 5
THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTUAL PAYOFF AND THE KERNEL PREDICTOR
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